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THE CONTEXTUAL LEGITIMACY OF ADJUDICATION
IN TRIBAL COURTS AND THE ROLE OF THE TRIBAL
BAR AS AN INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITY: AN ESSAY
FRANK POMMERSHE1M*
I. INTRODUCTION
Tribal courts are the frontline tribal institutions' that most often confront
issues of self-determination and sovereignty as well as the more routine
legal business of processing name changes and routine divorce actions.
They are the vanguard entity for advancing and protecting the right of
tribal self-government, while at the same time they are charged with
providing reliable and equitable adjudication in the many and increasing
number of matters that come before them. In light of these burgeoning
functions, tribal courts find themselves subject to increasing scrutiny from
both the media2 and the federal courts.'
Tribal courts can do little about the scrutiny-for it comes with the
territory of prominence and extended growth-but they must continue to
be cognizant of the unique problems that they face. This is especially
true in the wake of their development as a window of opportunity through
which many would assess the current status of tribal self-government and
reservation well being in general. One of these notable, but unexamined,
outcomes is the realization that part of their growing significance within
Indian country is the concomitant increase in the number of individuals-
both law-trained Indians and non-Indians and non-law trained tribal advo-
cates-that appear before them. This growing number of practitioners
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I. See, e.g., the United States Supreme Court's most recent statement in this regard in Iowa
Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 107 S. Ct. 971, 976 (1987), that "'tribal courts play a vital role in tribal
self-government . . . and the Federal Government has consistently encouraged their development."
2. See, e.g., Weiser, Injustice at Rosebud, Washington Post, Sept. II, 1984, at Al; Schmickle
& Buoen, Indian Courts: Islands of Injustice, Minneapolis Star and Tribune, Jan. 5, 1986, at IA,
Jan. 6, 1986, at IA, Jan. 7, 1986, at IA.
3. See, e.g., Iowa Mut. Ins. Co., 107 S. Ct. 971; National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow
Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845 (1985); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978); for a
general discussion of access to the federal courts, see also Pommersheim and Pechota, Tribal
Immunity, Tribal Courts, and the Federal System: Emerging Contours and Frontiers, 31 S.D.L.
REV. 553 (1986). Note also that the United States Supreme Court made it clear in both National
Farmers Union, 471 U.S. 845, and Iowa Mut. Ins., 107 S. Ct. 971, that tribal courts are to be the
primary forum for adjudicating civil disputes that arise on the reservation.
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along with the increasing volume and diversity of litigation in tribal courts
raises significant questions of first impression about the nature and func-
tion of the tribal bar and the context in which it makes decisions.
It is the goal of this Article to review and to examine some of the
contours and questions surrounding this emerging phenomenon within
most tribal judicial systems. Part of this essay reviews the history of tribal
courts, surveys the different types of tribal courts, and provides a sample
of the diverse practice requirements that exist. It plumbs both the roots
and contemporary settings of many tribal courts in order to illustrate
underlying policy questions.
The analytical section of the Article treats the more abstract and critical
questions of contextual legitimacy4 of adjudication in tribal courts and
whether a tribal bar functions as a significant interpretive community5
that provides a reliable. framework which helps to identify values and to
define the parameters of legal advocacy and judicial decisionmaking within
tribal court systems. In other words, it seeks to probe the issue of whether
the tribal bar enhances contextual legitimacy and adequately functions to
monitor and focus the nature of permissible legal argument and adjudi-
cation in tribal court.
Tribal courts-whether praised or vilified 6-have never been analyzed
from such a conceptual vantage point. However, these very elements are
arguably the cardinal principles in determining the viability of tribal courts
to advance important tribal values, as well as in rendering case by casejustice in terms of reliability and fairness. Such a view has nothing to do
with the adoption of non-Indian, state-like standards (whatever they might
be), but rather has its roots in a commitment to understanding how justice
and judicial self-realization are achieved in any legal system and how
such worthy aspirations may be further advanced.
II. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF TRIBAL COURTS
Tribal courts in Indian country do not find their origins in any specific
statutory authorization, but rather in the early administrative practice of
the Bureau of Indian Affairs and in the subsequent and implicit author-
ization suggested by the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934.' This view,
4. This term looks to the social, historical, and cultural setting of judicial adjudication rather
than, for example, the simple logical application of rules of law in order to measure the systemic
viability and appropriateness of judicial decisionmaking. See infra note 64 and accompanying text.
5. See generally S. FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? 13-17 (1980) describing interpretive
communities as a community of practitioners whose responsibility is to determine the meaning of
the text (particularly a literary text). These observations are also clearly pertinent to the role of the
practicing bar as an interpretive community whose text is the law and legal experience.
6. See supra note 2 and D. GErcHEs & C. WILKINSON, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 376-94 (2d ed. 1986).
7. 25 U.S.C. §§461-62, 464-79 (1983); 25 U.S.C. §463 (Supp. 1987).
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of course, does not consider the existence of tribal adjudicatory mechanisms'
that may have pre-existed or existed in tandem with formally identified
tribal courts. Such concerns are, however, often critical in examining the
issue of legitimacy and are discussed later in this essay.
The 'need' for some form of tribal court system emanated from the
perception of local and national non-Indian administrators in Indian coun-
try that some formal device was necessary to regulate law and order on
the reservation.9 Prior to the formal authorization from the Secretary of
Interior in 1883 to establish Courts of Indian Offenses,'0 local agents
resorted to a variety of expedients. The most common solution was for
the agent himself to act as a judge, or to delegate the duty to one of his
other subordinates or to a trusted Indian. This practice, though not sta-
tutorily authorized, was in line with the course of action suggested several
times by earlier Commissioners of Indian Affairs and Secretaries of the
Interior, Who envisioned the local agents as justices of the peace."
Despite these ad hoc practices throughout Indian country, the specific
impetus for Courts of Indian Offenses seemed to come from the reform
impulse of Secretary of Interior H.M. Teller who was appointed in 1882. 12
Commissioner Price compiled a set of rules for Courts of Indian Offenses,
which were approved on April 10, 1883 by Secretary Teller and circulated
to the agents. 3 These rules provided guidelines for court organization
and procedure and an abbreviated criminal and civil code.'" The only
express qualification for prospective jurists was that they not be poly-
gamists. The range ofjurisdictional authority was thought to be modelled
after that of a Justice of the Peace in the state or territory where such a
court was located.' 6
It was recognized from the first that there was, at best, a shaky legal
foundation for these tribunals. '7 There was no statutory authorization for
the establishment of such courts, only the generally acknowledged author-
ity of the Department of the Interior to supervise Indian affairs. " Because
there was no authorizing legislation defining the jurisdiction of the Courts
8. All tribes possessed, at some time, traditional methods for adjudicating disputes. See, e.g.,
K. LLEWELLYN & E. HOEBEL'S classic study THE CHEYENNE WAY: CONFLICT AND CASE LAW IN PRIMMVE
JURISPRUDENCE (1941). For more recent attempts in this vein see, e.g., Zion, The Navaho Peacemaker
Court: Deference to the Old and Accommodation to the New, I I AM. IND. L. REV. 89 (1983).
9. W. HAGAN, INDIAN POLICE AND JUDGES 104-07 (1966).
10. Id. at 104.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 107.
13. Id. at 109.
14. Id.
15. Id. at I10.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., Snyder Act, 25 U.S.C. § 13 (1983); 25 U.S.C. §§ 13(b)-13(e) (1986).
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of Indian Offenses, the courts and police were often challenged. The
usual reaction of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs in the face of a
challenge was to try to avoid a showdown. 9 In this regard, there was
unblemished success; no successful challenges were brought against the
Courts of Indian Offenses.2" Tribal courts remained fragile and volatile
for all concerned.
The tasks of the Courts of Indian Offenses became vastly more com-
plicated when the ravages of the allotment2' process and the sale of
"surplus" 22 tribal lands brought substantial numbers of non-Indians as
permanent residents to the reservation. The bright line which separated
white and Indian communities was obliterated. Jurisdictional dilemmas
became apparent. Various questions arose, including: What courts had
(or would accept) jurisdiction over whites, over Indian allottees, over
mixed bloods? How would these courts be financed? These dilemmas are
still not fully resolved today, almost one hundred years later.23
Despite the principal claim that the Courts of Indian Offenses were
necessary to maintain law and order on the reservation, other motives
were at work. For example, the 1892 revision provided "[tihat if an
Indian refuses or neglects to adopt habits of industry, or to engage in
civilized pursuits or employments, but habitually spends his time in idle-
ness and loafing, he shall be deemed a vagrant," and punished accord-
ingly.24 The "need" for law and order often meant a "need" for acculturation
and assimilation. This notion of reform often sought to impose or instill
19. W. HAGAN, supra note 9 at 145.
20. See, e.g., United States v. Clapox, 35 F. 575 (D.C. Or. 1888). Clapox has been cited with
approval in every subsequent case upholding the legality of Courts of Indian Offenses. See, e.g.,
Settler v. Yakima Tribal Court, 419 F.2d 486, 489 (9th Cir. 1969); Colliflower v. Garland, 342 F.2d
369, 373 (9th Cir. 1965); Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 231 F.2d 89, 95 (8th Cir. 1956).
21. This process began with the Dawes Severalty Act, 25 U.S.C. §331 et seq. (1983), which
was also known as the General Allotment Act of 1887, and had as its principal goal the break-up
of the tribal tradition of communal ownership through the means of providing individual Indians
with specific allotments ranging from 80-160 acres. The objective was to convert Indians into
individual farmers and ranchers and thereby make them readily assimilable into the surrounding
non-Indian farming and ranching communities. The policy failed dismally resulting mainly in the
reduction of the nationwide Indian land base from 138 million acres in 1887 to 48 million acres in
1934. For an expanded description, see generally D.S. OTs, THE DAWES ACT AND ALLOTMENT OF
INDIAN LANDS (1973).
22. The Allotment Act also gave the Secretary of Interior authority to negotiate with any tribe
whose members had all been allotted, or, where the President believed it to be in the tribe's best
interest, to purchase the unallotted or 'surplus lands' land within the reservation. 25 U.S.C. § 348
(1983). These lands were subsequently made available for non-Indians to homestead.
23. The persistent questions involving the dilemma of who has jurisdiction, that is whether the
federal, tribal, or state government may claim bona fide authority over any given matter in Indian
country, is an enduring and significant theme that permeates Indian law. See generally F. COHEN,
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 281-386 (1982 Ed.), and D. GETCHES AND C. WILKINSON,
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 416-78 (2d ed. 1986).
24. W. HAGAN, supra note 9, at 120.
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"proper virtues" in Indians and was particularly characteristic of federal
policy during the period 1871-1928.'
Courts of Indian Offenses were established when the agent and Com-
missioner of Indian Affairs concluded they were practicable and desira-
ble-that is for all Indians but the Five Civilized Tribes, the Indians of
New York, the Osage, the Pueblos, and the eastern Cherokees, all of
which had recognized tribal governments. The peak of their activity was
reached around 1900 when about two-thirds of the agencies had their
own courts. 26 Some agencies never established a court and others exper-
imented with them only briefly." The penurious appropriations of Con-
gress for the courts limited the number that could function at any time.
The Commissioner of Indian Affairs determined where the courts would
be located. An Acting Commissioner in 1891 expressed this process and
its unbounded discretion with the words "as it may appear the good of
the Indian Service requires."28
Finally, the wheels of reform began to turn in Indian country. The late
1920's saw renewed public concern for the conditions on Indian reser-
vations. Reports appeared that criticized white controlled land tenure
patterns, growing poverty, and administrative abuse in Indian country.29
The 1928 Meriam Report3° initiated by Secretary of Interior Hubert Work
is the best known of these, but it made no recommendations on the subject
of law and tribal courts. The situation, the Report argued, varied too
greatly from tribe to tribe.3
The Indian Reorganization Act of 193432 was the culmination of this
reform movement. One of the sweeping changes it sought to accomplish
was in the area of law and order on Indian reservations. John Collier,
the then Commissioner of Indian Affairs, proposed a sweeping reform
bill that dealt with four major areas: self-government, special education
for Indians, Indian lands, and a Court of Indian Affairs.33 The Collier
proposal envisioned a dual system of tribal courts. The first level was to
be organized under the self-government title of the proposed act.' Tribes
25. See, e.g., D. GETCHES AND C. WILKINSON, supra note 23, at 111-22. For expanded treatment
see F. PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN INDIANS
609-757 (1984); H. FRrrz, THE MOVEMENT FOR INDIAN ASSIMILATION 1860-1890 (1963).
26. W. HAGAN, supra note 9, at 109.
27. Id.
28. Acting Commissioner R. B. Belt as quoted in W. HAGAN, supra note 9, at 109.
29. Comment, Tribal Self-Government and the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 70 MICH. L.
REV. 955, 955-61 (1972); W. HAGAN, supra note 9, at 150.
30. INSTITUTE FOR GOV'T. RESEARCH, STUDIES IN ADMINISTRATION, THE PROBLEM OF INDIAN
ADMINISTRATION (1928).
31. W. HAGAN, supra note 9, at 150.
32. 25 U.S.C. §§461-62, 464-79 (1983); 25 U.S.C. §463 (Supp. 1986).
33. V. DELORIA, JR. & C. LYTLE, THE NATIONS WITHIN 76-79 (1984).
34. Id. at 76.
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would be able to continue their local court as either a Court of Indian
Offenses or as a tribal court created through specific authorization in the
tribe's constitution adopted pursuant the Indian Reorganization Act.35
At the same time, a national Court of Indian Affairs would be staffed
with seven judges appointed by the President and subject to confirmation
by the Senate. The court would always be in session and would be held
in a number of different circuits. Each judge would be responsible for a
particular region.36
The jurisdiction of this special Court of Indian Affairs was set out in
Section 3 of the proposed legislation." The Court would assume respon-
sibility over the following matters: major criminal cases, cases where an
Indian tribe or commdnity was a party, cases involving questions of
commerce where one litigant was an Indian and the other a non-Indian,
civil and criminal cases involving a tribal ordinance where a party was
not a member of the Indian community, questions involving Indian allot-
ments where the rights of an Indian were involved, and issues involving
the determination of heirs and the settlement of such things as estates,
land partitions, and guardianships.3
According to some commentators, a number of provisions in the Court
of Indian Affairs title would have changed the traditional concept of Indian
justice rather significantly." All federal guarantees to criminal defendants
and the federal rules of evidence would apply. In essence, the court would
duplicate the system of procedure and appeal that prevailed in the-federal
court system.' Of course, there was no Indian thinking or input consid-
ered in the drafting of the bill." If things were not going well42 on the
reservation, improvement lay in the ratcheting up of applicable federal
standards. 4"
Despite these familiar difficulties, the Collier Bill did go a long way
in attempting to bring an improved sense of justice to Indian country. In
addition to the powers already discussed, the proposed court could have
removed cases from tribal and state courts and heard appeals from local
35. See, e.g., ROSEBUD Sioux TRIBAL CONS. art. IV § 1(k) (1935).
36. DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 33, at 76.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 77.
39. Id. See also D. GETcHEs & C. WILKINSON, supra note 23, at 128-29; F. POMMERSHEIM, BROKEN
GROUND AND FLOWING WATERS 13-14 (1979).
40. DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 33, at 77.
41. Id. at 78.
42. The notion of "things not going well" on the reservation is meant strictly in the non-Indian,
dominant society sense, wholly unhinged from the local perspective of the tribe and its members.
43. For a more recent example, there is the controversy involving the adoption and implementation
of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-03 (1983). See Coulter, Federal Law
and Indian Tribal Law: The Right to Civil Counsel and the 1968 Indian Bill of Rights, 3 COLUM.
SURVEY OF HUMAN RIms LAw 49, 50 (1971).
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tribal courts.' The Secretary of Interior was also authorized to appoint
ten special attorneys to provide legal advice and representation to both
tribes and individual Indians before the court.45
Not unexpectedly, as with much of the proposed Collier bill, this title
generated a- great deal of controversy during the legislative hearings.'
The final enactment of the bill which became known as the Indian Reor-
ganization Act (herein IRA) of 1934, or the Wheeler-Howard Act, bore
faint resemblance to the original proposal.47 The title dealing with the
Court of Indian Offenses disappeared entirely.
Under the IRA, tribes were to draft their own constitutions, adopt their
own laws, and set up their own court systems. 4' Regardless of the statutory
provisions, most tribal constitutions were drafted by the Bureau of Indian
Affairs without tribal input and consequently reflected little, if any, direct
local concern.49 As a result, there was no opportunity to formally rein-
stitute traditional law on the reservation, ° even if it existed at the time.
These Bureau constitutions did not provide for any separation of powers
and did not specifically create any court system. Most constitutions, rather
facilely it seems, recognized a power in the tribal council-the elected
legislative body-to "promulgate and enforce ordinances providing for
the maintenance of law and order and the administration of justice by
establishing a reservation court and defining its duties and powers. ""
Most tribal legislation also required the approval of the Bureau of Indian
Affairs.52 In recent years, a number of tribes have amended their consti-
tutions to remove the Bureau of Indian Affairs approval power.53 It is
important to note, however, that the exercise of these tribal constitutional
powers (whether by an IRA tribe or not) are not to be considered the
exercise of federally delegated powers, but rather the exercise of a tribal
sovereign authority which predates the United States Constitution.54
The current tribal codes of most tribes which serve to elucidate the
44. DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 33, at 78.
45. Id.
46. Readjustment of Indian Affairs: Hearings on H.R. No. 7902, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
47. DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 33, at 140-53.
48. 25 U.S.C. §476 (1983).
49. DELORIA & LYrLE, supra note 33, at 173. See generally G. TAYLOR, THE NEw DEAL AND
AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBALISM: THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INDIAN REORGANIZATION Act 1934-45
(1980).
50. See, e.g., D. GETCHES, ED., NATIONAL AMERICAN INDIAN COURT JUDGES ASSOCIATION, INDIAN
COURTS AND THE FUTURE 7-13 (1978).
51. ROSEBUD SIOUX TRIBAL CONS. art. IV § I(k) (1935).
52. Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 195 (1985).
53. See, e.g., ROSEBUD SIoux TRIBAL CONS. former art. IV §2 (1935), repealed at art. IV § 1
(1985). This requirement did not, and does not, generally arise in a non-IRA tribal constitution.
See, e.g., Kerr-McGee Corp., 471 U.S. 195.
54. See, e.g., Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
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framework of tribal court activity are a combination of unique tribal law
and adapted state and federal law principles. Apparent in the newer codes
is a decided commitment to develop increased tribal statutory, including
customary, law and an organized and reported body of tribal decisional
law.
III. REQUIREMENTS TO PRACTICE IN TRIBAL COURTS
The legal requirements to practice before tribal courts are set legisla-
tively by tribal councils. It is useful to note, however, that there are two
broad categories of tribal courts. These categories are the "CFR" courts,
which are the successors to the Bureau of Indian Affairs' Courts of Indian
Offenses, and all other tribal courts established pursuant to constitutional
and legislative enactment of tribal legislative bodies. CFR courts are
largely governed by federal administrative regulations and are therefore
widely regarded as entities subject to extensive and excessive Bureau of
55. The term 'C.F.R.' refers to the Code of Federal Regulations. The pertinent regulations are
found at 25 C.F.R. §§ 11. 1-11.306 (1987). A specific listing of tribes with C.F.R. courts is found
at 25 C.F.R. § 11. l(a) (1987) and includes the following:
(1) Omaha (Nebraska).
(2) Flandreau (South Dakota).
(3) Yankton (South Dakota).
(4) Wind River (Wyoming).
(5) Bois Forte (Minnesota).
(6) Red Lake (Minnesota).
(7) Cocopah (Arizona).
(8) Kaibab (Arizona).
(9) Hopi (Arizona) (Tribal court enforcement of special grazing regulations).
(10) Fallon (Nevada).
(1I) Goshute (Nevada).
(12) Lovelock (Nevada).
(13) Te-Moak (Nevada).
(14) Yomba (Nevada).
(15) Duckwater Shoshone (Nevada).
(16) Kootenai (Idaho).
(17) Shoalwater Bay (Washington).
(18) Hoopa (California)(Jurisdiction limited to special fishing regulations).
(19) Anadarko Area Tribes (Western Oklahoma).
(20) Choctaw (Mississippi).
(21) Eastern Cherokee (North Carolina).
(22) Louisiana Area (Louisiana) (Includes Coushatta and other tribes in the State
of Louisiana which occupy Indian country and which accept the application
of this part; provided that this part shall not apply to any Louisiana tribe
other than the Coushatta Tribe until notice of such application has been
published in the FEDERAL REGISTER.)
Note also the disparaging description of C.F.R. reserations at 25 C.FR. § 11. 1(b) (1987) which
states that "[It is the purpose of the regulations in this part to provide adequate machinery of law
enforcement for those Indian tribes in which traditional agencies for the enforcement of tribal law
and custom have broken down for which no adequate substitute has been provided under Federal
or State law."
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Indian Affairs control and influence. These regulations, however, contain
no provisions relevant to admission to practice before such courts and
therefore such authority falls to the particular tribal council, subject, of
course, to approval of the Secretary of Interior.56
25 CFR § 11. 1(e) provides that "nothing in this section shall prevent
the adoption by the tribal council of ordinances applicable to the individual
tribe, and after such ordinances have been approved by the Secretary of
Interior, they shall be controlling, and the regulations of this part which
may be inconsistent therewith shall no longer be applicable to that tribe. " 7
For example, the Yankton Sioux Tribe that operates a CFR court is con-
sidering an amendment to its tribal code that anyone who wishes to be
admitted to practice before the Yankton Sioux Tribal Court may be admit-
ted upon motion in writing by order of the Chief Judge. The relevant
requirements state:
Any person who is a member in good standing of the bar of any
state of the United States, is of good moral character, and demon-
strates to the Court a thorough knowledge of the Code, the Rules of
the Yankton Sioux Tribal Court and Federal Laws and Regulations
applicable to the Yankton Sioux Tribe, and some knowledge of the
culture and traditions of its members, is eligible to apply for admis-
sion to general practice in this court. Any person who is eighteen
years of age or older, has not been convicted by a felony, or a
misdemeanor in the past year, is of good moral character and dem-
onstrates a thorough knowledge of this Code, the Rules of the Yank-
ton Sioux Tribal Court, and knowledge of the culture and traditions
of the Yankton Sioux People, is eligible to apply for admission to
general practice in this court as lay counsel or lay advocate.58
These not atypical requirements broadly delineate the common threads
and considerations for practice before any tribal court. "Professional"
attorneys are usually admitted to tribal practice if they are members in
good standing of the bar of any state or federal court.59 Lay counsel or
56. 25 C.F.R. § 11.1(e) (1987).
57. Id.
58. Proposed amendment to the Yankton Sioux Tribal Code Title 4 § 15.15 (1980). There are no
current requirements in the Yankton Sioux Tribal Code concerning admission to practice before the
tribal court.
59. See, e.g., Blackfeet Tribal Code Ch. 9 Rule 10(A) (1974) ("[admitted to practice before the
highest court of a state or before the Supreme Court of the United States .... ); Flathead Tribal
Code Ch. I §9 (1960) ("[any professional attorney appearing before the Tribal Court must be a
member in good standing of the Montana Bar Association."); Fort Belknap Tribal Code Ch. 2 § 12
(1976)("[a]ny attorney admitted to practice before the highest court of a state or before the Supreme
Court of the United States is eligible for admission to practice in the Fort Belknap Tribal Court.");
Standing Rock Sioux Tribal Code § 1(601)(a) (1985) ("[a]ny attorney at law who is a member in
good standing of any state or federal court shall be eligible for admission to practice before the tribal
Winter 1988]
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tribal advocates are usually admitted to practice if they are tribal members
of good moral character." Despite the requirements of knowledge of
culture and tradition that are sometimes mentioned, these elements, to
my knowledge, are never actually tested. No tribe currently administers
its own bar examination for either professional attorneys or lay advocates
although some tribes are in the process of developing such requirements."
Admission to tribal practice also generally creates fees and dues obli-
gations. These fees may be either in the nature of one time fees or annual
court."); Mescalero Apache Tribal Code Ch. 13-2-1 (1983) ("[e]ach attorney who wishes to practice
before the Tribal Court must submit an application to practice to the Tribal Council President. Said
application shall be accompanied by certificates from the Clerks of the Supreme Court of any state
and the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico.") Note, interestingly, this same
section limits practice to "criminal cases only, and where otherwise specified"; Pueblo de Acoma
Tribal Code Ch. 3.12.5 (1984) ([any attorney who is a member of the New Mexico State Bar, or
any attorney certified and eligible to practice before the courts of any other State or the United States
is eligible to be admitted to practice.") Note that Ch. 3.12.4 provides that "[iln all civil matters,
professional attorneys may not appear unless specifically authorized to do so by the Tribal Council."
60. See, e.g., Blackfeet Tribal Code Ch. 9 Rule 10(B) (1974) ("[tlhe court may admit to practice
on such terms and conditions as appear appropriate, a lay advocate who shall be a member of the
Blackfeet Tribe .... "); Flathead Tribal Code Ch. I § 9 (1962) ("[any member proposing to represent
another member of the Tribe, before the Tribal Court, must be of good moral character and must
not have been convicted of a felony, or of a misdemeanor for a year last past his proposed appearance
before the Tribal Code."); Fort Belknap Tribal Code Ch. 2 § 12 Rule 10 (1976) ("Itlhe court may
admit to practice on such terms and conditions as appear appropriate, a lay advocate who shall be
a member of the Gros Ventre or Assinibone Tribes of the Fort Belknap Indian Community."); Standing
Rock Sioux Tribal Code § l(61)(b) (1985) ("[any Indian of the Reservation shall be admitted to
practice before the court as a lay counselor upon application."). Mescalero Apache Tribal Code Ch.
13-1-1 (1983) ("[any enrolled member of the Mescalero Apache Tribe may represent any person
before the Tribal Court, providing that said representative is not a member of the Tribal Council, A
tribal Judge, or employee of the court."); Pueblo de Acoma Tribal Code Ch 3.1.2 (1983) (["all
lay counsel . . . may be admitted to practice upon approval of application in writing by order of
the chief judge, provided he or she is an enrolled member of the Pueblo of Acoma.") Note that
there is explicit recognition of the right to represent litigants in civil cases. Pueblo de Acoma Ch.
3. 11. 1(a) (1983).
Note that some tribal codes permit lay advocate status to individuals who are not tribal members.
See, e.g., Fort Belknap Tribal Code Ch. 2 § 12 Rule 10 (1976) and Blackfeet Tribal Code Ch. 9
Rule 10(C) (1974) ("[tjhe court in its discretion may admit any other person to appear before it as
an advocate, upon successful completion of an application and questionnaire on tribal law prepared
by the Chief Judge .... "); Crow Creek Tribal Code Ch. 2 (1980) (" [a]ny Paralegal, Legal Assistant,
Tribal Court Advocate, Legal Intern or other employee of a professional law firm who is directly
supervised by a professional attorney admitted to practice before the Court shall be eligible for
admission to practice before the Court.").
61. See, e.g., Rosebud Sioux Tribal Code Title 9, Ch. 2 § 4 (1985) (requiring attorney candidates
to take the tribal bar examination.). However, no such bar examination has yet been given, although
at the request of the Chief Tribal Judge I have had students doing advanced research to develop
possible questions for the bar exam. Attorneys are still admitted to tribal practice based on the
requirement they be an active member in good standing of the South Dakota State Bar or certified
to practice before the highest court of any other state or the Supreme Court of the United States as
set forth in the same section of the Code. Note also that the Pueblo de Acoma Tribal Code Ch.
3.12.5 (1984) also has a bar examination requirement but as of September, 1987, it too has not been
implemented. But see also the Navajo Nation Bar Association By-Laws § IlIA (1978) which require
taking and passing the Navajo Nation Bar Examination as a condition for membership in the
Association.
[Vol. 18
TRIBAL COURTS AND THE TRIBAL BAR
dues. Fees for professional attorneys range anywhere from $5 to $250,
while fees for lay advocates range from $0 to $50.62
IV. THE CONTEXTUAL LEGITIMACY OF ADJUDICATION IN TRIBAL
COURTS
The title of this essay suggests the importance of two critical terms,
namely "contextual legitimacy" and "interpretive community" as key
canons in helping to understand the nature and quality of adjudication in
tribal courts. Each term will first be defined and examined and then
brought to bear in the tribal court context.
The concept of contextual legitimacy represents a particular gloss on
the fundamental concept of formal legitimacy. In the United States legal
system, this demand for (formal) legitimacy has traditionally rested on
the pristine view that judges should decide cases in accordance with the
law. Most conventionally and simply stated, this has meant that any
judicial decision must logically follow from the authoritative legal rule
or rules, and not, for example, from personal or other values which are
not validated by the law.63 This classic formulation has been seriously
criticized as inadequate to explain the relationship of judicial adjudication
to the larger legal and political system of which it is a part. Further
criticism argues that the legal and political system cannot be adequately
understood apart from its social, historical, and cultural context.'
It is this notion of contextual legitimacy that looks to the social, his-
torical, and cultural setting of judicial adjudication that produces a most
fruitful framework for examining tribal courts and tribal court adjudi-
cation. Tribal courts need to be viewed within this wide focus in order
to better understand what social and cultural values are actually becoming
embedded in these young systems. This is necessary to avoid a sterile
analysis that looks to a narrow consideration about the application of
rules of law unhinged from the larger concerns of tribal integrity and
culture.
The concept of "contextual legitimacy" is a post-formalist view that
62. See, e.g., Rosebud Sioux Tribal Code Title 9, Ch. 2 § 2 (1985) (attorney admission fee $100);
Blackfeet Tribal Code Ch. 9 Rule 10(A) (1974) (attorney admission fee $25); Fort Belknap Tribal
Code Ch. 2 § 12 Rule 10 (1976) (attorney admission fee $25); Sisseton-wahpeton Tribal Code Ch.
32 § 2 (1982) (attorney admission fee $5); Mescalero Apache Tribal Code Ch. 13-2-1(E) (1983)
(attorney annual fee $250); Pueblo de Acoma Tribal Code Ch. 3-12-6(e) (1983) (attorney annual
fee $50). As for tribal advocates, see, e.g., Sisseton-Wahpeton Tribal Code Ch. 32 § 2 (1982) (tribal
court advocate fee $5); Rosebud Sioux Tribal Code Title 9, Ch. 2 § 2 (1985) (tribal court advocate
fee $50). It is important to note that many codes do not specifically identify or discuss fees and
dues obligations though it is reasonable to expect dues and fee requirements to exist and be set by
the appropriate tribal legislative authority.
63. S. BURTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL REASONING 169 (1985). This section of
the essay draws substantially on the analytical framework set forth in this appealing work.
64. Id. at 187-88.
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suggests the meaning of legitimacy shifts from a concern for antecedent
legitimating foundations, such as the logical application of rules of law,
to a demand for a legal and political system which on the whole enjoys
and merits the allegiance of the people. The propriety and integrity of
adjudication therefore depends on their contribution to the legitimacy of
the legal and political system in its social, historical, and cultural con-
text.65
Contextual legitimacy in this view has two interrelated components,
namely the obligation and the desire to abide by the law within a legal
and political system that merits people's fidelity and affirmation. Whether
this obligation is generally recognized by the people is a question of social
fact. Whether the desire exists to abide by the law is more a normative
question. Yet neither aspect taken alone is sufficient to establish contextual
legitimacy, and the two together imply a tension between the search for
a more orderly and just society and the requirements of a constitutional
democracy.'
Although much of this undoubtedly sounds arcane, I believe it has
significant import in examining tribal court systems. One of the dilemmas
that permeates tribal courts is this whole notion of legitimacy. Certainly
there are (or have been) identifiable segments of most tribes that refuse
to consider tribal courts legitimate. In this regard, many tribal courts are
vilified as "white men's" creations flowing from the IRA and an entire
federal history directed to assimilation. The courts are seen as instruments
of outside forces and values that are not traditional and therefore not
legitimate.
On the other hand, there are segments of most tribal populations (and
local non-Indian populations) who view tribal courts as illegitimate because
they fall, or appear to fall, far below recognized state and federal standards
in such matters ranging from the institutional separation of powers to the
provision of civil due process and enforcement of judgments. These
combined forces often threaten the viability of tribal courts as legitimate
justice rendering mechanisms.
Legitimacy becomes illegitimacy when large numbers of people in fact
cease to recognize an obligation to abide by law or judicial decisions
with which they disagree. This is further aggravated in the tribal context
when the tribal government, itself, may refuse to abide by tribal court
decisions or submit to tribal court jurisdiction.67 Needless to say, real
claims of illegitimacy have been made throughout United States legal
history, ranging from the colonial claim of illegitimacy under the con-
65. Id. at 199.
66. Id. at 199-200.
67. See, e.g., Pommersheim and Pechota, supra note 3, at 564-67.
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tinued rule of the British crown to the large scale civil disobedience of
segregationist laws in the South during the 1960's. Nevertheless, these
wrenching claims have been weathered with the assistance of large doses
of modification and reform.
It has been suggested that the normative aspect of contextual legitimacy
depends on whether the system as a whole adequately contributes to a
more orderly and just society in light of contemporary circumstances and
evolving notions of justice.' Such a view does not deny the importance
of change and reform but holds that such claims not challenge the legit-
imacy of the system as a whole.' It is here, I believe, that tribal courts
find themselves most delicately placed. The increase in the bona fide
legitimacy of tribal courts is (and has been) inextricably bound to their
amenability to change and reform that increases the net perception of the
development of a more orderly and just system and society. This enhanced
perception has actively drawn from both streams-traditional and pro-
gressive-of discontent.
What then, one might ask, are some examples of this growing legiti-
macy of tribal courts? Numerous examples exist and include such things
as the increase of law trained Indian people within many systems, tribal
and constitutional code revision, the nascent development of traditional
and customary law, and the continued recognition of tribal courts by the
United States Supreme Court7' as viable and important forums for res-
olution of reservation based claims involving both Indians and non-Indi-
ans.
A recent vivid example demonstrating the growth and development of
legitimacy involves the following experience. During a recent visit 7' to
the Rosebud Sioux Tribal Court, Associate Judge Sherman Marshall, who
is a law trained, bilingual member of the Rosebud Sioux Tribe, addressed
students of my Indian law class. In the course of his presentation, Justice
Marshall stated several times that he believed it was part of his job (but
obviously not in his job description) to travel to the twenty tribal com-
munities scattered over the most rural parts of the reservation to discuss
what the tribal court was and what it was doing. Mr. Marshall understood
full well that the success and legitimacy of the court depends, in significant
part, on the understanding and support of community people-many of
whom know little about tribal court or have had negative and dispiriting
experiences with it. Legitimacy, at the grass roots level, is not a given,
but rather the bedrock of much necessary but unappreciated toil. It is not
68. S. BURTON, supra note 63, at 202.
69. Id. at 187-88.
70. See, e.g., Iowa Mut. Ins., 107 S. Ct. 971; National Farmers Union, 471 U.S. 845; Santa
Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. 49.
71. A visit with my Indian law class to the Rosebud Sioux Tribal Court in October 1986.
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only the message but also the messenger. It is important to note that a
young, law-educated tribal member who is bilingual and bicultural is an
emblematic figure, poised between two worlds, bringing the best message
of both.
A second experience from the field trip provides an important example
about the nature of legitimacy in the framework of the hearing of an
actual case. In this instance, Justice Marshall was hearing a small claims
matter between a grandmother and her daughter concerning the alleged
failure of the daughter to pay the grandmother for taking care of her
children.72 Both parties were tribal members and were unrepresented as
is the norm in both tribal and state small claims proceedings.
Mr. Marshall requested the plaintiff to tell her story. She began and
went on for sometime in a seemingly long and circular narrative. Mr.
Marshall spoke to her several times briefly in Lakota, the tribal language
of the Rosebud Sioux. She answered in Lakota and went on mixing
English and Lakota. When she finally finished, he asked several direct
questions necessary to making appropriate findings of fact. He then pro-
ceeded in the exact same manner to address and listen to the defendant.
He concluded by informing the parties that he needed additional docu-
mentation and after he received it, he would make a prompt decision.
It was readily apparent that an unusual rapport was established between
the judge and the parties. They could speak without interruption (a cultural
prerogative of elders) and in their first language. Contextual legitimacy
was palpable; yet the entire case and its hearing raised ongoing questions
about the nature of legitimacy in tribal settings.
The process of striving for legitimacy is far from over and must continue
as a dynamic force in Indian country. Many questions remain, including:
those involving the development of traditional and customary law, the
separation of powers, authentic appeal, and the enforcement of individual
civil rights within the tribal context. In particular, the example cited above
illustrates the need to discover the best possible means for resolving
disputes that are primarily cultural, rather than strictly legal, in nature.
Yet, as always, the core of legitimacy rests with the people themselves.
Without their support and understanding, there can be little hope for
continued advancement and growth.
A review of the elements of legitimacy of the dominant legal system
72. The roots of this dispute are more cultural than financial. The plaintiff indicated that she had
brought this action not so much for the alleged money owed but to seek redress for the (cultural)
wrong she suffered. As an elder and grandmother she felt an important cultural rule was violated
when her daughter came and simply removed her children who were staying with the grandmother
without obtaining the grandmother's endorsement and consent for their return. The nature of the
dispute raises significant questions about whether there is or should be some other non-legal, but
culturally consonant way, to mediate the conflict.
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as a whole also provides a fruitful comparison. The legitimacy of the
legal system better merits the support of the people if it includes com-
ponents that serve three functions related to stable features of the social,
historical, and cultural context: (1) a professional community to run and
watch the system on a case-by-case basis, (2) institutions that operate at
some distance from majoritarian politics, and (3) a legal conversation
that uses legal reasoning in the search for a more orderly and just society
to augment lawmaking processes that reflect majoritarian and other polit-
ical preferences.73
A. Professional Community
What is the nature of the "professional" community that runs and
watches the legal system on a case-by-case basis? Most tribal codes permit
the admission of two quite different groups to the community of recog-
nized practitioners, namely law trained individuals (i.e., Indian and non-
Indians who are law school graduates and admitted to practice in some
state or federal jurisdiction) and tribal advocates (i.e., tribal members
admitted to tribal practice generally without any education or examination
requirement).7"
The issue here is how these groups come together, or can come together,
to form a community helping to carry out an important legitimating
function. Some suggestions for strengthening the tribal court legal com-
munity include the development of a tribal bar examination, the provision
of tribally sponsored CLE (Continuing Legal Education) programs, and
the adoption and enforcement of a tribal ethics code. The development
and implementation of a tribal bar examination aids in securing a profes-
sional community that shares a common legal and cultural understanding
of the procedural and substantive (including tradition and custom) legal
matrix that governs in tribal court. A tribal bar examination, in addition
to furthering basic tribal legal community competence in accordance with
tribally developed standards, serves to advance legitimacy by assisting
in the fulfillment of the expectation of responsible self-government. It
reflects an exercise of autonomous power that is credible and necessary
to maintain and to increase parity with other sovereigns within (and even
without) the federal system. The implementation of a tribal bar exam
requirement illustrates institution building that does not simply mimic or
rely on state developed credentials or requirements.
Secondly, the notion of tribal bar sponsored CLE programs would
augment professional community competence and understanding of new
73 S. BURTON, supra note 63, at 230.
74. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
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legal developments, especially within the context of federal Indian law
and local tribal law changes. In the latter category, programs involving
such topics as the development of tribal tradition and customary law, the
enforcement of judgments, and client counseling would seem particularly
appropriate." CLE programs would also provide one of the few oppor-
tunities for tribal bar members to come together informally and to socialize
in order to form a face to face community with a better understanding
of each other as individuals participating in a community of common
endeavor.
A third area of importance is that of ethics and the development of an
effective ethics code and enforcement program to deal with those few
individuals who do not comport with tribally sanctioned standards. The
ethics code must not only establish appropriate standards of representation
but also provide the necessary administrative machinery to hear com-
plaints and, if necessary, apply corrective sanctions.76 Any professional
community worthy of the name must have the ability to maintain standards
of integrity and safeguard the interests of litigants from the gross impro-
prieties of their legal representatives. The legal community, in general,
has been subject in recent years to growing criticism from the general
public because of its seeming inability and/or unwillingness to adequately
police its own members. Tribal bars ought not let themselves get caught
in that web of criticism and mistrust.
These three elements, if pursued in a vigorous and timely manner, can
do much to advance the development of a well trained, qualified, up to
date, and self policing organization to which litigants and the entire
community can entrust the day to day monitoring of the legal system.
Such efforts would further augment the strength and vitality of the message
that Justice Marshall and other tribal judges would be able to take to the
community.
Such efforts, of course, take time, money, and commitment. Yet time
is plentiful, the cost is not prohibitive, and the commitment to improve-
75. Few, if any tribes, put on their own CLE programs. There is some training (principally for
tribal judges) provided by such national tribal groups as the National American Indian Court Judges
Association (NAICJA). Local training for tribal judges and tribal court advocates is often provided
by Indian legal services programs such as the DNA-People's Legal Services program in Navaho
country and Dakota Plains Legal Services program in the Dakotas. States occasionally have CLE
programs on Indian law topics. However, no CLE program effectively brings together the full
spectrum of tribal practitioners including judges, attorneys, and tribal advocates.
76. Some tribes do have tribal code provisions dejineating broad criteria for suspension or dis-
missal. See, e.g., Rosebud Sioux Tribal Code Title 9 Ch. 2 §§ 8-9 (1985) (suspension for contempt
or acting in an unethical or improper manner); Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribal Code Ch. 32 § 5
(1982) (disbarment or suspension for false swearing, conviction of a felony, disbarred by a federal
or state court, conduct unbecoming an officer of the court, and failure to act as counsel for a defendant
upon assignment by the court). Very few codes identify a detailed administrative procedure to be
followed.
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ment certainly exists on most reservations. It is more a matter of placing
these efforts in the necessary pipeline of tribal priorities in order to insure
the necessary tribal legislative, executive, and judicial commitment to
these endeavors.
B. Institutions Outside Majoritarian Politics
The second component of legitimacy concerns the existence of legal
institutions that operate at some distance from majoritarian politics and
seek to resolve the dilemma that majoritarian views standing alone cannot
produce legitimacy for all segments of a society or tribe. For example,
during large parts of American history, majorities have been able to
enslave or oppress substantial minority communities including Blacks,
women, and Native-Americans. The legal system and the professional
community operating within it-however imperfectly-have often been
able to maintain and vindicate the rights of individuals and groups to be
treated equally and fairly under the law.
The legitimacy of the system is particularly enhanced if it provides for
the protection of rights and the advancement of justice for individuals or
groups who are unable to protect their basic rights and interests through
majoritarian politics. Litigation and adjudication thus provide a mean-
ingful alternative to disobedience, which manifests a rejection of legiti-
macy. 
77
Such a view raises poignant questions in the context of tribal court
systems. This dilemma involving individual and group rights is partic-
ularly acute when considering the nature of the rights sought to be rec-
ognized within tribal systems. The controversy over the Indian Civil
Rights Act (herein ICRA) of 19687 is particularly instructive. In that
controversy, the notion of strong individual rights that could be enforced
against the majority government was alien to the tradition and custom of
many tribes where the group, not the individual, is primary."9 The Act
was further criticized as another example of the unilateral imposition of
federal standards"° that abridged tribal sovereignty.
These elements of controversy came to a head and were, at least,
partially addressed by the United States Supreme Court in Santa Clara
Pueblo v. Martinez.8 ' Martinez made it clear that tribal courts were the
appropriate forums for adjudication of individual claims concerning such
77. S. BURTON, supra note 63, at 212. For an interesting example concerning the occupation of
Wounded Knee on the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation see DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 33, at 213-
14.
78. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-03, 1321-26, 1341 (1983).
79. See, e.g., Coulter, supra note 43, at 49-50.
80. Id.
81. 436 U.S. 49.
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ICRA individual guarantees as due process and equal protection. Other
federal court decisions held that tribal courts would be accorded some
leeway in determining the exact substantive content of these provisions.2
Many tribal courts have not yet arrived at an accommodation of these
dictates and continue to avoid the force of the Martinez decision through
the continued use of the shield of sovereign immunity.83 This legal device
prevents any resolution of claims involving individual rights on their
merits and further inhibits the growth of legitimacy. The matter is not
easily resolvable, but some observations and suggestions seem in order.
Tribal councils and other decisionmakers are increasingly faced with-
this dilemma of individual rights. There is a need to fashion remedies in
tribal court that allow for some resolution of individual claims against
the tribe, but there is also a need to balance bona fide tribal concern with
allowing relief that might grind tribal activity to a halt or impoverish
tribal coffers. The prospect of unlimited or paralytic injunctive relief
justifiably concerns many tribes, particularly when there may be limited
access to tribal or federal appellate review. Accommodation and the fash-
ioning of limited relief in the form of declaratory judgments, limited
monetary recovery, and modest injunctive relief would serve to constitute
a viable starting point.
The twin specters surrounding continued inaction on this issue are the
prospect of an aggravated perception of illegitimacy by tribal members
and further imposition of federal standards encroaching on tribal sover-
eignty. Tribes need to continue, and in some cases to begin, moving
cautiously forward to avoid either or both of these inimical results.
This is particularly necessary in light of the additional problem sug-
gested by the separation of power concerns. Most tribal constitutions do
not provide for separation of powers' and the tribal courts are direct
legislative creatures subject to complete defeasance and manipulation
(including the removal of personnel) by tribal councils. Such situations
are not ordinarily conducive to neutral adjudication on the merits. Many
tribes are sensitive to this problem and have moved to a policy of de
facto, if not de jure, separation of powers.85 The separation of powers
82. See, e.g., Tom v. Sutton, 533 F.2d 1101 (9th Cir. 1976); Wounded Head v. Tribal Council
of Oglala Sioux Tribe of Pine Ridge Reservation, 507 F.2d 1079 (8th Cir. 1975); McCurdy v. Steele,
506 F.2d 653 (10th Cir. 1974); Conroy v. Frizzell, 429 F. Supp. 918 (D.C.S.D. 1977).
83. See, e.g., Pommersheim and Pechota, supra note 3, at 578. But see also Taylor, Modern
Practice in Tribal Courts, 10 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 231 (1987) for a somewhat different view.
84. No IRA tribal constitutions and very few, if any, non-IRA tribal constitutions provide for
separation of powers. This seems to reflect a major oversight by the federal drafters from the Bureau
of Indian Affairs and the Justice Department whose handiwork dominates most tribal constitutions.
See also Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 195 (1985).
85. This observation is based on personal experiences with tribal courts in South Dakota and
interviews with (former) Judge Sambroak of the Rosebud Sioux Tribal Court, Judge Marshall of the
Rosebud Sioux Tribal Court, Judge Rousseau of the Sisseton-Wahpeton Tribal Court, and Judge
Greaves of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Court.
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issue can be, at least in the short run, resolved by such a defacto approach,
and therefore, not hinder the commitment to developing augmented legit-
imacy. Nevertheless, more detailed and thoughtful approaches are needed
to meet the persistent, long-term need for legitimacy that rests, in part,
on the institutional integrity of the tribal judiciary.
C. Legal Reasoning
The third element contributing to contextual legitimacy involves a
commitment to legal reasoning as a potent device for securing a more
orderly and just society and developing a body of law to complement the
lawmaking of majoritarian elected officials.8 6 The force of legal reasoning
in daily adjudication is an important idea, for it raises the question of the
appropriate kind of legal reasoning to be advanced in tribal courts.
The recognized standard and style of legal reasoning that is appropriate
for tribal court adjudication must be determined. The importance of iden-
tifying such a standard and style is to identify a sufficient common ground
for advocates and judges that permits intelligent consideration of the issues
before the court in any particular case. Without such common ground,
reasoned adjudication and adequate representation of litigant's claims are
unlikely. This is not to suggest that the legal reasoning (and attendant
values) must be like those of the dominant legal system. Instead, there
must be an adequate agreement and understanding of the kind of legal
reasoning that is appropriate in a tribal court context.
It is therefore critical that in the attempt to fairly resolve disputes in
tribal courts the parameters of proper reasoning and argument be better
demarcated. It is essential to delineate, for example, what is the permis-
sible, the preferred, or the expected style of argument (and applicable
authority) and what is its identifiable form. This notion of how to best
articulate the manner in which to develop argument and to create the
resulting judge made law is critical in developing legitimacy within the
tribal legal community, itself. Tribal practitioners, law trained and not,
must act and argue in concordance with an understanding and belief in
the legitimacy and proper category of their advocacy.
In contrast to the other aspects of contextual legitimacy, legal reasoning
does not lend itself to any particular commitment to reform or change,
but only to developing growing sensitivity and refinement as to what is
actually permitted, and what ought to be encouraged in tribal court argu-
ment. In other words, what is needed is a commitment to the development
and the emergence of an interpretive community.
V. THE TRIBAL BAR AS AN INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITY
The legal community as a whole plays a significant role in guiding the
86. S. BURTON, supra note 63, at 232.
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adjudication of cases as they come before the courts. In this respect, the
legal community serves as an interpretive community;8 7 that is a com-
munity of practitioners who largely determines what is permitted and
what is normative in the context of arguing and developing the law in
the process of adjudication. This interpretive community plays several
important roles in guiding the adjudication of cases in the established
state and federal systems. At least two of these roles raise important
questions about the nature of developing adjudication in tribal courts.
One role is that of establishing the nature and style of permissible
argument in actual cases. The second more intangible, but no less critical,
role is in identifying, if not actually defining, the central values of the
legal system. As to these concerns, it has been suggested that:
What distinguishes the legal community from other interpretive
communities is the presence of order and justice at the center of our
webs of beliefs about law, the principles of legitimacy, stare decisis,
and legislative supremacy near the center, and the commitment to
legal reasoning in bringing these values and principles to bear in
particular cases.88
The function of the legal community as an interpretive community is
therefore, in part, to define the acceptable parameters of the legal rea-
soning brought to bear in deciding cases. These recognized conventions
include: 1) the language of legal discourse, 2) the practice of developing
argument through legal research, and 3) the commitment to the rule of
law.89 The presence of these conventions also constrains judges to rule
and decide cases within this generalized framework. The importance of
these precepts is that they establish sufficient common ground to allow
members of the legal community to present claims in such a manner that
may be intelligently understood, debated, and decided.
Such rules are necessary in order to insure litigants that their claims
will be clearly understood and that they stand on equal footing with all
other participants in the system. It is in this regard that tribal court
adjudication is often uncertain as to the appropriate legal conventions of
discourse, argument, and authority. The question is how does one argue
(and then decide) cases in tribal court. What is the proper or accepted
method for arguing cases? Without development of this framework,
unnecessary uncertainty may become pervasive. Attorneys, tribal advo-
cates, and tribal judges must all know what the nature of proper argument
is within a tribal court. Without it, justice and fair representation are not
possible.
87. See, e.g., S. FIsH, supra note 5, at 13-17.
88. S. BURTON, supra note 41, at 209.
89. Id. at 96.
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The easy answer is to say, of course, that it is no different from what
is expected in state or federal court. Yet I do not think this is by any
means the accepted consensus. If tribal courts are different (e.g., by
cultural choice or by their relative youth), how is the nature of legal
argument different? Tribal courts, for example, are often described as less
formal than state or federal courts.' But what does that mean? Obviously,
many cases handled by any court, particularly local state and tribal courts,
are quotidian and a matter of routine. In the routine cases, less formality
has no great significance, but in contested cases it is different. In such
circumstances, does less formal mean less rigorous, requiring less pro-
cedural precision in terms of the admissibility of evidence? Does less
formal mean there is a lower expectation or standard for the marshalling
of coherent substantive argument? Or, does less formal mean less rigid
constraints in seeking fairness and justice, or less concern with the arti-
ficial and often extrinsic rule of law?
More broadly, is conventional legal reasoning too narrow and restrictive
in that it rules out important tribal knowledge and wisdom, such as in
the realm of spiritual metaphysics and community insight? This is not,
of course, as extreme as it seems when thinking about native societies
that do not necessarily recognize or accept the secular/sectarian, rational/
spiritual dichotomies taken for granted in the dominant society.
The point of all this is not which (including any of the many possibilities
not mentioned) of these approaches is better or more preferable, but rather
the necessity of developing agreement of what is required within the
interpretive community. In other words, the need is to insure litigants,
whether Indian or non-Indian, of a guarantee to have a meaningful oppor-
tunity to be heard and to have a meaningful day in court. Meaningful
should be defined in both of the key senses of the form and content of
their claims and argument.
In short, legal argument in actual cases depends on what members of
the legal community let pass without objection as acceptable legal rea-
soning for the purposes of a case.9 Newly created tribal bars must there-
fore strive to identify and to articulate these canons. This is not something
that is necessarily easily done, but it is more likely to occur if attention
is directed toward it. It is also more likely to emerge or become apparent
if tribal bars come together more frequently and more directly to address
these and other related matters. This is particularly true when tribal advo-
cates who are not law trained, but are members of the tribal bar, play a
significant role in providing representation before tribal courts including
tribal appeals courts.
90. See, e.g., V. DELORIA, JR. & C. LYTLE, AMERICAN INDIANS, AMERICAN JUSTICE 193-202 (1983).
91. S. BURTON, supra note 63, at 209.
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One of the functions of legal education, apart from substantive training,
is socialization into the profession, which involves explicit and implicit
training in what and how to argue cases. Tribal advocates, in this respect,
need exposure to these realities. Or, if the nature of acceptable advocacy
in tribal forums is contrary to this training, law trained individuals need
to be disabused of that part of their tradition.
Part of this notion of the role played by an interpretive community is
especially important in the context of building and developing tribal
institutions. By any measuring device, formal tribal courts-most of
which were established sometime after passage of the IRA-are young,
developing institutions. Part of the benefit of such relative youth is the
ability to chart the future on one's own terms. Tribal courts are in the
process of becoming; they are not calcified into any particular mold.
An interpretive community aids in this ongoing process to forge and
to clarify the values that underlie the process of adjudication and the legal
system as a whole. For example, the values of order and justice are most
often mentioned in this kind of description of the dominant legal system.92
Are tribal legal systems committed to the same web of values in the same
proportion or are there equal concerns for such competing values as
cooperation, community, and conciliation? The point is that tribal courts
do not have to blindly imitate the interpretive strategies and canons dis-
played in federal and state settings. If tribal interpretive strategies and
goals are to be different, it is necessary to be conscious of why and how
this should be so.
If tribes and tribal members and practitioners are interested in actively
directing this process, tribal bars provide an ample opportunity to provide
guidance in the direction of desired growth. Again, this ongoing process
is subtle and not always visible in the tribal court's daily work of deciding
cases and creating a recognizable body of reported decisions and tribal
common law. It is therefore not easily subject to legislative direction.
Yet it bears thinking and reflection-surfacing at least for indirect con-
sideration-about what practitioners in tribal courts ought to be doing
and saying and why.
The Intertribal Court of Appeals,93 for example, explicitly recognizes
and addresses this phenomenon in at least one respect. Rule 17 of the
Court states that "in recognition of the oral tradition in tribal history and
culture, and to speed the hearing and just disposition of cases on appeal,
92. See, e.g., S. BURTON, supra note 63, at 101-237.
93. The Intertribal Court of Appeals was established in 1982 and is located at Ft. Thompson,
South Dakota, and currently involves the following tribes: The Lower Brule, Crow Creek, Sisseton-
Wahpeton and Flandreau tribes of South Dakota, the Omaha and Winnebago Tribes of Nebraska,
and the Three Affiliated Tribes of North Dakota.
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the Court may waive the requirement of legal briefs in selected cases." 9 4
Yet the rule may only be applied when both parties proceed pro se.95 The
waiver of written briefs is not available to represented parties. This approach,
of course, treats all members of the tribal bar, law trained or not, as
members of the same professional, interpretive community responsible
to the same standard of competence and performance. Is this a good rule
properly situated and defined? Should it be extended? What values are
advanced or submerged by the rule?
V. CONCLUSION
Tribal courts perform important adjudicatory functions within the tribal
system, but more importantly they are the primary tribal institutions
charged with carrying the flame of sovereignty and self-government. In
their difficult and challenging position, they face important developmental
questions related to contextual legitimacy and the role of nascent tribal
bars as interpretive communities identifying core values and techniques
that promote tribal court maturity, competence, and fulfillment.
The need for both the respect and allegiance of the communities which
these courts serve, as well as the comity and deference of state and federal
judicial systems, also places great weight on the shoulders of tribal courts
and tribal bars. The future of tribal justice and integrity hangs in the
balance.
94. Intertribal Court of Appeals Court Rule 17 (1982).
95. Id.
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